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SUMMARY 
 
Previously, our workplaces were characterised by serious hardships emanating from labour 
laws which did not always cater for all areas of the employment relationship. South African 
female employees were without a clear legitimate remedial right precluding any severe 
violation and infringement to their fundamental rights resulting from their pregnancy; a task 
they did not opt for in the first place, but was instead, naturally imposed on them as a result of 
their gender category. Undoubtedly, many female employees were victims of unfair 
discrimination.  
 
The legislature therefore saw it fit to democratise the workplace by making rapid statutory 
interventions. As a result, a number of significant changes in various spheres of our labour 
laws were brought in. Amongst the greatly notable valuable changes was the introduction of 
the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. This piece of legislation has generally reformed our 
industrial society by bringing in the elimination of unfair discrimination and thereby 
enhancing the principle of equity in the workplace. The act has further touched a place within 
hearts of female employees for fear of discrimination as a result of their pregnancy status or 
any reasons related to their pregnancy. The act further codified Industrial Court decisions that 
were already established under the discrimination law jurisprudence from the Labour 
Relations Act 28 of 1956. The application of the provisions of the Act has made the 
employment relationship no longer to be a comfort zone for employers. These general 
changes to the law also impact on the dismissal law regime.  
 
The purpose of this treatise is to give an overview of the applicable legislation and 
contributions made by the Labour Courts in developing pregnancy dismissal and 
discrimination law. The Labour Courts have handed down few judgements that have helped in 
clarifying the provisions of both the current Labour Relations Act and the Employment 
Equity Act around the topic. One should hasten to say that this has never been a smooth 
process by the courts. It is further shown in this treatise that some of the court decisions were 
not well accepted in the light of other important considerations, such as the equality 
provisions of the Constitution. 
 
 iii
For the purpose of effectively dealing with this topic, this treatise contains a discussion of the 
historical context of discrimination law in the form of common-law position, and the 
discrimination law before the Bill of Rights and the Constitution. It then endeavours to 
identify the legislative provision of the Act when it comes to discrimination law provisions. 
At the same time the important court decisions that were made are identified and examined.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The changing roles of women and, related to that, of men as well, the changing nature of 
parenting, the changing nature of work, and the changing character of the workplace present 
challenges in our society that are bewildering in their complexity. Among these challenges is 
the issue of how our society is fairly to deal with the pregnancy of women. Closely related to 
that is the issue of parenting and its interface with the workplace. 
 
Prior to the advent of a constitutional state with a Bill of Rights, and the promulgation of the 
labour legislation there was no protection for pregnant working women in South Africa. Once 
a working woman fell pregnant she was allowed to work up to four weeks prior to the 
expected date of her confinement. She was not allowed to work for any employer during the 
period of eight weeks immediately after the date of her confinement.1 However, during the 
life of the previous Labour Relations Act,2 the Industrial Court softened the blow for the 
pregnant working women to some degree by requiring the employer to justify the dismissal of 
a pregnant woman.3 Viewed in the context of comparative jurisprudence, our law in this 
sphere was seriously lagging behind however. It is therefore not surprising to note that the 
legislature has seen fit to make rapid statutory interventions. There are however no readily 
available solutions.  
 
From the aforegoing it is self-evident that our own jurisprudence over the last years has 
developed significantly to catch up with international trends in this sphere. It speaks for itself 
that the provisions of the LRA should be read in constitutional context.4  
 
Given South Africa’s apartheid history, the issue of what to do with female employees who 
are discriminated against in the workplace is an emotionally charged topic. Most employees 
                                                 
1  S 17(6) of the BCEA 3 of 1983. 
2  Act  28 of 1956. 
3  Randall v Progress Knitting Textiles Ltd (1992) 13 ILJ 200 (IC). The decision ultimately turned on the 
fact that the employer had in the past allowed a ‘white female employee’ to take maternity leave and had 
kept her position for her during her absence, thereby creating a clear precedent from which they deviated 
in this instance. See also Collins v Volkskas Bank (Westonaria Branch) - A Division of ABSA Bank Ltd 
(1994) 15 ILJ 1398 (IC), in which the court stated that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy amounted 
to indirect discrimination. 
4  See among others Business SA v COSATU (1997) 18 ILJ 474 (LAC); Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 
(1998) 19 ILJ 1425 (LAC), Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd v CWIU (1999) 20 ILJ 89 (LAC). 
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regard such conduct as an insult warranting statutory intervention. The case for unfair 
discrimination within the employment context is built on the Employment Equity Act, 1998 
(hereafter “the EEA”). The Act makes detailed provision for discrimination disputes and 
further compels all employers to take steps to eliminate unfair discrimination in any 
employment policy or practice. In the olden days the use of the word “discrimination” in its 
modern sense was, if not unheard of, considered to be a serious solecism. One has only to 
compare dictionary with fairly recent past editions to understand discrimination. It is therefore 
no secret that the term “unfair discrimination” refers to a range of behavioural attitudes 
directed towards targeted groups which results inequalities emanating from discriminatory 
practices.5 
 
It can be accepted that discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy is also a form of 
discrimination on the grounds of sex. The fact of pregnancy may therefore be a relevant factor 
which may fairly be taken into account in deciding whether or not to offer employment to a 
woman. It is however clear that in respect of this issue, as with so many others, the solution 
does not lie in the courts presenting society with unrealistic rules of law- however attractive 
they may otherwise seem to be. Fairness, and fairness alone should be the yardstick. 
 
In view of the above, the primary purpose of this paper is to explore some key issues in 
determining the fairness of pregnancy related dismissals emerging from the provisions of the 
South African statutes and decided cases dealing with dismissals relating to pregnancy and the 
reasons related thereof. This paper is further intended by to scrutinize various positions as to 
how this type of discrimination and dismissal has been viewed by the labour courts. 
 
The purpose of this treatise is to explore some key issues emerging from dismissal due to 
pregnancy. The determination of fairness, the onus of proof in discrimination cases, causation, 
commercial rationale and the validity of the “job continuity requirement” as a defence will 
also be examined. Further attention will be given to social security for pregnant employees 
and a further in-depth focus on our leading domestic jurisprudence comparable to foreign 
jurisprudence around the topic. 
 
                                                 
5  According to Longman Active Study Dictionary New Edition discrimination means “when a group of 
people is treated unfairly: against”. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DISMISSAL DUE TO PREGNANCY 
 
Pregnancy is the means by which human life is reproduced and is accordingly of fundamental 
importance to our society at large6. In our law the situation in regard to an employee’s 
pregnancy is clear. Discrimination based on pregnancy of an employee can have dire 
consequences for an employer, especially when the discrimination occurs within the context 
of an unfair dismissal. No employee may be dismissed for any reason relating to her 
pregnancy. If an employer dismisses a pregnant employee it may constitute an automatically 
unfair dismissal7. This kind of dismissal received little attention than other types of dismissals 
in the pre 1956 LRA. In the period prior to the Wiehann Commission, relatively no decisions 
were recorded for pregnancy dismissals. During this period, it is assumed, termination of 
employment was based on the principles of the common-law contract of employment even if 
the reasons for such termination were on the ground of pregnancy. The concept of substantive 
fairness for pregnancy related dismissals had no place in the common-law contract of 
employment. While the law may be clear, things are not that easy for employees.  
 
Female employees have traditionally been the target of abuse as a result of the pregnancy 
status. The challenge of the Labour Courts is to interpret the LRA consistently with the 
constitutional right not to be unfairly discriminated against and the courts have made a 
number of decisions that have helped in clarifying the provisions of the Labour Relations Act8 
(hereafter as the “LRA”). Few cases9 of the Labour Courts have attempted to deal with this 
issue. It is therefore interesting to note how the converse scenario was dealt with by the 
Labour Courts. However, from various judgments it appears that the blanket guarantee of the 
right not to be discriminated against as a fundamental right in the constitution has led to a 
wide interpretation of what is meant by “discrimination”. The provisions of the Act dealing 
with discrimination, as well as authoritative case law will require employers to examine the 
way they handle discrimination issues.  
                                                 
6  Woolworths v Whitehead supra. 
7  S 187 of the Labour Relations Act no 66 of 1995. 
8  Act  66 of 1995. 
9  See amongst others Abbott v Bargaining Council for the Motor Industry (Western Cape) (2001) 22 ILJ 
2647 (LC); Botha v Import Export International CC (1999) 20 ILJ 2580 (LC), Mashava v Cuzen & 
Woods [2000] 6 BLLR 691 (LC); Whitehead v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 2133 (LC); 
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead (2000) 6 BLLR 640 (LAC); Sheridan v The Original Mary-Ann’s at 
the Colony (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 2952 (LC). 
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2.1 PREGNANT JOB APPLICANTS AND EMPLOYEES 
 
As a general rule, our courts view with disfavour discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy, 
also where it concerns applicants for employment. Section 9 of the EEA expressly includes an 
“applicant for employment” under the protection against unfair discrimination. The pregnancy 
of a job applicant may legitimately be taken into account where the operational requirements 
of the job are such that it would be unreasonable to expect the employer to employ the 
applicant. In examining the reasonableness of the decision one would have to be satisfied that 
it is rationally related to the employer’s business interests and give proper weight to the 
employee’s interest, as a woman, to equal treatment. Job applicants for example, have 
pronounced fear of disclosing the fact that they are pregnant during the course of a job 
interview, fearing that this fact could sway the employer to decide against appointing them. 
Whatever the judgments of the Labour Court10 and the Labour Appeal Court.11 
 
Even after appointment, employees even knowing that they are protected by labour legislation 
against discrimination on the basis of their pregnancy, may still be reluctant to disclose the 
fact of their pregnancy to their employers. The cases indicate that they may have reason to 
fear discrimination or even dismissal if they do so. One interesting issue in this regard relates 
to the difference between an “employee” and an “applicant for employment”. Employees are 
protected against the whole range of possibly discriminatory policies and practices. In 
contrast, an applicant for employment is, by definition, only protected against unfair 
discrimination in the employer’s decision about whom to appoint. The question therefore 
arises as to when an applicant for employment actually becomes an employee. The 
importance of this question lies in the formulation of the applicant’s case. Should an 
“employee”, who turns out to be no more than an “applicant for employment” complain only 
of a discriminatory dismissal there is, in fact, no basis for the allegation and, quite possibly, 
further consideration of the case. In Whitehead v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd,12 the view was 
expressed that an applicant becomes an employee only when work is actually performed in 
terms of the agreement or, at least, when performance is tendered and refused.13 This, 
                                                 
10  See Whitehead v Woolworths (1999) 20 ILJ 2133 (LC); [1999] 8 BLLR 862 (LC). 
11  See Woolworths v Whitehead (2000) 6 BLLR 640 (LAC). 
12  Supra. 
13  Paras 10-14 (ILJ); at 865 D-866A (BLLR). (See Hutchinson “Termination of an Employment Contract 
prior to its commencement” November 1999 Labour Law News & Court Reports Volume 9 No 2). 
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according to the Court, would mean that, even in the presence of an earlier agreement, 
“employee” status is only conferred on an applicant for employment once actual performance 
in terms of that agreement commences or when a tender of performance is refused.  
 
2.2 ANY REASONS RELATED TO PREGNANCY 
 
Employers are also prohibited from dismissing employees for any reason related to 
pregnancy14 and this is expressly dealt with in the LRA. In Mashava, the only dominant 
impression in the matter was that the decision of the company to terminate the employee’s 
employment contract was solely influenced by her disclosure that she was pregnant. Put 
differently, the eventuality that gave rise to the termination was the realisation of the 
employee’s pregnancy and this clearly means that had it not been because of the employee’s 
pregnancy, she would have continued working. The dismissal of the employee was therefore 
found by the court to be unfair.  
 
In Mnguni v Gumbi15 the phrase “any reason related to pregnancy” which the legislature has 
made use of in section 187(1)(e) was found to be wide enough to cover the dismissal of the 
applicant in the case.  The Court further held that when the employer dismisses an employee 
on grounds of pregnancy, he is obliged to apply the guidelines applicable to dismissals for 
medical incapacity.16 
 
2.3 INTENDED PREGNANCY 
 
Intended pregnancy, as referred to in the LRA, presumably provides for a situation in which a 
woman has expressed a desire to become pregnant, and is then discriminated against. It is 
however interesting to note that the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act,17 defines “pregnancy” to include both “intended” and “potential” 
pregnancy. In Australia, for example, the Federal Sex Discrimination act prohibits 
discrimination on the ground of potential pregnancy. The Australian Act defines “potential 
pregnancy” to include not only a desire to become pregnant, but also include the fact that the 
                                                 
14  Mashava v Cuzen & Woods  (2000) 6 BLLR 691 (LC). 
15  (2004) 6 BLLR 558 (LC). 
16See Schedule 8 item 10 of the LRA. The first step would be to determine whether the employee‘s 
incapacity is temporary or permanent and that is, the extent of the incapacity. Unreasonably long absence 
may be treated as akin to permanent incapacity. 
17  S 1 of Act 4 of 2000. 
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woman is or may be capable of bearing children, or the fact that the woman is likely, or is 
perceived as being likely, to become pregnant. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PROTECTION AFFORDED BY THE STATUTES 
 
3.1 LEGISLATIVE REFORMS 
 
Until the advent of the 1995 Labour Relations Act, nothing prevented an employer from 
refusing to appoint someone else on the basis of, eg gender, pregnancy or race. An applicant 
for work also had no standing to declare a dispute with an employer, even though the victim 
of unfair discrimination. Although some of the overtly discriminatory measures were removed 
from legislation in the early 1980’s, there was no specific legislation which expressly and 
comprehensively outlawed discrimination in the workplace.18  
 
3.2 THE CONSTITUTION TAKES HOLD 
 
The Constitution plays a vital role in providing a bridge between an unjust past and a just 
future. The Constitution19 now commands us to strive for a society built on the democratic 
foundational values of human dignity, and the achievement of equality. It also affords a 
pregnant woman the right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the 
law. It should however come as no surprise, that within the Bill of rights itself, equality is 
listed as the first substantive right and is not only a guaranteed and justifiable right but a 
standard which all law (including labour laws) must be tested for constitutional consonance.20 
Section 9(3)21 of our Constitution enumerates pregnancy as one of the grounds upon which a 
person may not discriminate unfairly. 
 
                                                 
18  See Louw “Sex Discrimination and the Labour Relations Act’ (1990) 2 SA Merc LJ 164 at 164-165, and 
Catherine O’Regan “Comment: Race and Sex Discrimination in the Workplace” (1991) 1 Labour Law 
News and Court Reports 1 at 2. 
19  Act 108 of 1996 of the Republic of South Africa. 
20  Some academic writers draw attention to the place of the right to equality as a constitutional value, which 
goes beyond the individual or personal affront of the claimant. See Albertyn & Goldblatt ‘Facing the 
Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality’ 
(1998) 14 SAJHR 248 at 272-3. See also Gutto Equality and Non-discrimination in South Africa: The 
Political Economy of Law and Law Making (2001) at 128, who discuses equality as a core or foundational 
value.  
21  The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy.  
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Purpose 
 
The purpose of the statutory protection afforded to pregnant women is to ensure that they are 
not disadvantaged. In Brown v Stockton-on-Tees Borough Council22 Lord Justice Griffiths in 
the House of Lords held: 
 
“S 34 (now 60) must be seen as a part of social legislation passed for the specific 
protection of women and to put them on an equal footing with men. I have no doubt that 
it is often a considerable inconvenience to an employer to have to make the necessary 
arrangements to keep a woman’s job open for her whilst she is absent from work in order 
to have a baby, but this is a price that has to be paid as part of social and legal recognition 
of the equal status of women in the workplace.” 
 
O’Regan,23 points out that simply prohibiting discrimination on grounds of pregnancy fails to 
resolve the complex policy question of how the costs incurred in childbearing should be borne 
in our society.24 She states: 
 
“In conclusion, anti-discrimination legislation is unlikely to be an effective tool to 
promote equality for women in employment because it is founded on principles of 
symmetry and individualism. The principle of symmetry requires women to be treated in 
the same way as men; but it breaks down where women are biologically different to men, 
for example, in the case of pregnancy and where their social experience is different.” 
 
3.3 THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT PROTECTION 
 
The Act25 embraces both formal and a substantive approach to equality. Section 6(1) of the 
Act provides as follows: 
 
“No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an employee, in any 
employment policy or practice, on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, 
culture, language and birth.” (author’s emphasis) 
 
The prohibition against unfair discrimination under the Act mirrors the wording of the 
equality provision of the Constitution. Pregnancy is similarly listed in the Promotion of 
                                                 
22  [1988] IRLR 263. 
23  Now a judge of our Constitutional Court. 
24  Entitled Equality at work and the limits of the law: Symmetry and individualism in anti-discrimination 
legislation appearing in Gender and the New SA Legal Order edited by Christina Murray and published 
by Juta's in 1994. 
25  S 6(1) of Act, No. 55 0f 1998. 
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Equality Act.26 The purpose of protecting female employees from discrimination for reasons 
of pregnancy, intended pregnancy or reasons related to pregnancy is to ensure as far as 
possible that female employees are not disadvantaged, as they traditionally have been, by 
virtue of their being woman and the child-bearing members of the human race.27 
 
3.3.1 TO WHOM IS THE PROTECTION EXTENDED? 
 
Section 6 of the Act protects an employee against unfair discrimination. The context suggests 
that the word refers only to an employee. The question that arises is therefore whether the 
above provision has a limited protection to employees only or whether it also includes job 
applicants. A close scrutiny of the section reveals that the prohibition of unfair discrimination 
and the remedies thereof are predicated on the person being an employee.  
 
3.3.1.1 In the case of Botha v Import Export International CC28 Marcus AJ held: 
 
“It follows that forms of detrimental treatment other than dismissal arising from a 
woman's pregnancy could constitute direct unfair discrimination. For example, a failure 
to appoint an applicant for employment because of her pregnancy or intended pregnancy 
could constitute unfair discrimination.” 
 
Marcus AJ also referred to the following in Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd as follows:29 
 
“Child-bearing and the capacity for child-bearing are characteristics of the female sex. So 
to apply these characteristics as the criterion for dismissal or refusal to employ is to apply 
a gender -based criterion.” 
 
3.3.1.2 In Whitehead v Woolworths,30 the Labour Court having found that the applicant was 
not an employee and hence excluded from the protection of section 187, the court per Waglay 
AJ commented as follows: 
 
“I must add that I find the definition of employee in the Act totally unsatisfactory. The 
definition should have included conferring the status of an employee and employer on the 
parties on the finalisation of a contract of employment even if such contract was only to 
take effect at some future date.” 
                                                 
26  S 1 (xxii) (a) of  Act No. 4 of 2000. 
27  Mashava v Cuzen & Woods Attorneys supra. 
28  (1999) 20 ILJ 2580 (LC), at 2586H-J. 
29  [1993] 1 WLR 49 at 53H; [1992] 4 All ER 929 (HL). 
30    Supra. 
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This finding of the court was approved by Willis JA on appeal.31 What is immediately 
apparent is that there is a tight fit between the anti discrimination provisions in section 
187(1)(f), section 6(1) of the Act and the equality provisions of the constitution. The support 
for a “substantive” notion of equality is apparent, and indirect and direct discrimination is 
prohibited. The definition in the current BCEA is also virtually identical to that in the 1995-
LRA and the discussion of the definition of “employee” in terms of the LRA may therefore be 
consulted. This therefore means that the jurisprudence developed under the successive Labour 
Relations acts will remain relevant in giving content to the meaning of “employee” for 
purposes of the Act. 
 
3.4 THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995: SECTION 187 PROTECTION 
 
One of the new features of the LRA is “automatically unfair dismissal”. Pregnancy is one of 
the critical areas relating to automatically unfair dismissals. In particular, this relates to ‘the 
employee’s pregnancy, intended pregnancy, or any reason related to her pregnancy. Unfair 
discrimination is the final ground for automatically unfair dismissal (and must be read in 
conjunction with the Employment Equity Act). No employer may dismiss an employee for 
reason of her pregnancy, intended pregnancy or for reasons related to a pregnancy. This is 
true and the principle stands firm. Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA states that the dismissal of an 
employee is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly 
discriminated against an employee, either directly or indirectly, on one or more of a number 
of non–exhaustive prohibited grounds. In addition, section 187(1)(e) determines that the 
dismissal of an employee on the basis of the employee’s pregnancy, intended pregnancy or 
any reason related to her pregnancy is automatically unfair. Significantly section 187(1)(f) is 
apparently a restatement of article 5(d) of Convention 158 of the International Labour 
Organization.  
 
3.4.1 In Mguni v Gumbi, the Labour Court had to consider whether there had been a 
dismissal. The Court found that the reason for the employee’s dismissal was related to her 
                                                 
31  Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead supra. See also Manqele v Wythe SA (pty) Ltd Unreported Labour 
Appeal Court Case No: JA50/03, where the court held that the definition of employee in s213 of the LRA 
can be read to include a person or persons who has or have concluded a contract or contracts of 
employment the commencement of which is or are deferred to a future date or dates. 
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pregnancy and that the provisions of section 197 (1) (e) were wide enough to cover the 
situation. The Court noted as follows:32 
 
“When the applicant told the respondent that she was tired and needed a rest, the 
respondent did not consult with her as to what the cause of tiredness was. He knew that 
she was pregnant and was due for maternity leave the following week. Despite knowing 
the cause of her tiredness he burst into anger, physically pushed her out of the workplace, 
threw her bag out after her and told her to go home and not come to work. This kind of 
treatment of an employee is outrageous and no longer has a place in this country. Gone 
are the days when employees were treated in the manner the respondent has treated the 
applicant and could do nothing about that.” 
 
3.4.2 In Whitehead, the Labour Court found that Whitehead could not claim to have been 
dismissed as she was not an employee as defined in section 213 of the LRA. In dismissing her 
claim of unfair dismissal that court remarked,33 inter alia, that a person, in terms of the 
definition of an employee- “is only an employee when such person has rendered a service to 
another which services are not that of an independent contractor”.  
 
3.4.3 In Jack v Director-General Department of Environmental Affairs34 the definition of 
employee was considered. The court acknowledged that the rendering of personal services 
and receipt of remuneration are the two criteria that define a contract of employment. Pillay J 
however remarked that if the finding in Whitehead were to prevail in the circumstances of 
Jack 
 
“the effect will be that the applicant for employment will be better secured by legislation 
than one who has concluded a contract of employment. Such differentiation is irrational 
and constitutionally untenable”. 
 
It is also trite law that once an offer of employment has been made, it becomes irrevocable.35  
 
3.5 THE BASIC CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ACT PROTECTION 
 
Section 17(6) of the old Basic Conditions of Employment 36 provided as follows: 
 
                                                 
32  At para 17 of the judgment. 
33  At 2173A-C. 
34  (2003) 1 BLLR 28 (LC). 
35  University of the North v Frank (2002) 8 BLLR 701 (LAC). 
36  Act 3 of 1983. 
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“No employer shall require or permit any female employee to work during the period 
commencing four weeks prior to the expected date of her confinement and ending eight 
weeks after the date of her confinement.” 
 
The new BCEA37 regards the absence during the period of confinement as leave. Secondly, 
before the employee takes leave, she must make arrangements with the employer as to when 
the maternity leave will commence and when it will end.  Furthermore, in terms of section 
87(1) of the new BCEA, the Minister must issue a “Code of Good Practice on the Protection 
of Employees during Pregnancy and after the Birth of the Child”.  This could be seen as a part 
of social legislation passed for the specific protection of pregnant employees and to put them 
on an equal footing with men.  
 
3.6 REMEDIES 
 
Automatically unfair dismissals qualify for the greatest amount of compensation as a remedy, 
namely up to 24 months remuneration. But not every employee can face Labour Court 
proceedings, and one suspects that there are more dismissals relating (directly or indirectly) to 
pregnancy than the few cases that gets reported. In few cases substantial compensation awards 
were granted where an existing employee had been dismissed because she was pregnant.  
 
3.6.1 In Mashava supra, the Court held that “the statutory provision for a maximum of 24 
months’ compensation for an automatically unfair dismissal should not be used as a yardstick 
against which to measure appropriate compensation. It was merely intended to set an upper 
limit on compensation”. 
 
3.6.2 In Hunt v ICC Car Importer Services Co (Pty) Ltd38 the Court ordered the employer to 
pay the (ex) employee an amount of six weeks remuneration which was equivalent to the 
period between the expiry of her maternity leave and the date on which she commenced 
working for the new employer. This was basically for patrimonial loss the employee had 
actually suffered. In addition the employer was ordered to pay six months solatium 
(sentimental “damages”) for the harm the employee had suffered.  
 
                                                 
37  Act 75 of 1997. 
38  1999 ILJ 364 (LC).     
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3.6.3 In Woolworths,39 Woolworths argued and hoped to persuade the Court that Ms 
Whitehead’s compensation ought to be assessed, not according to the formula laid down by 
the LRA. Taking his cue from what the Labour Appeal Court said in Johnson & Johnson 
(Pty) Ltd v CWIU,40 Judge Waglay held that compensation for unfair labour practices was not 
intended to be patrimonial but that, that such compensation, he said, should be “fair and 
reasonable”. Considering the appropriate compensation, the court held:41 
 
“In matters of unfair dismissal, once the court has decided that compensation should be 
granted it is obliged to grant at least the full amount as prescribed for by section 194(1), 
whereas in an unfair labour practice the court or the arbitrator must grant such amount as 
it considers to be fair and reasonable.” 
 
3.6.4 In Botha v Import Export International CC,42 Marcus AJ held that the way in which the 
applicant was dismissed was callous in the extreme.43 He found in the circumstances of that 
case the appropriate compensation to be the fullest extent allowed by section 194(3) of the 
LRA.  
 
In the result, a pregnant female employee who finds herself dismissed on the grounds that she 
is pregnant can now approach the Labour Court for protection. She could also argue that her 
dismissal also amounts to unfair discrimination on the ground of her sex. The latter argument 
can be entertained both under the Act and under the Constitution. Once it is established that 
the dismissal of the employee was based on the fact that she was pregnant, intended to 
become pregnant or for any other reason related to her pregnancy, she will be entitled to 
remedies set out in section 193 or 194 (3)44 of the LRA. 
                                                 
39  Supra. 
40  (1998) 12 BLLR 1209 (LAC). 
41  At para 45. 
42  Supra. 
43  See also Sheridan v The Original Mary- Ann’s at the Colony (Pty) Ltd (1999) ILJ 2952 (LC). 
44  The section provides that the compensation awarded to an employee whose dismissal is automatically 
unfair must be just and equitable in all the circumstances, but not more than the equivalent of 24 months’ 
remuneration calculated at the employee‘s rate of remuneration on the date of dismissal. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DETERMINING UNFAIRNESS 
 
At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that all human beings 
will be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular 
groups.45 Fairness is an elastic and organic concept. It is impossible to define with exact 
precision. It has to take account of the norms and values of our society as well as its realities. 
In the context of the LRA, fairness requires an evaluation that is multi-dimensional, and that 
is, at the very least, the situation is looked at from both the employer and the employee's 
perspective and the interests of society as a whole.46 Policy considerations also play a role. 
There may be features in the nature of the issue which call for restraint by a court in coming 
to a conclusion that a particular act of discrimination is unfair. 
 
4.1 THE TEST OF UNFAIRNESS 
  
The Act contains no criteria comparable to those in section 36 of the Constitution for 
justifying unfairness. An enquiry as to fairness would involve a moral or value judgment 
taking into account all the circumstances.47 Following the constitutional paradigm, the first 
step is to examine the extent to which the alleged discrimination impacts negatively on the 
rights or interests of the applicant.  
 
Once discrimination has been established, the question becomes how a court will determine 
the unfairness or otherwise of such discrimination. Where the discrimination is on a listed 
ground, the unfairness will be presumed and will have to be rebutted by the employer, relying 
on the available defences. In the case of unlisted ground, the complainant will have to 
establish that the discrimination was unfair. If the employee is able to show that the 
employer’s reason for dismissal was one which is automatically unfair under the statute, the 
                                                 
45  President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo [1997] 6 BCLR 708 (CC). 
46  See for example, National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd 1996 (4) SA 577 (A) 
at 593G-H; (1996) 17 ILJ 455 (A) at 461A-B; Dube v Nasionale Sweisware (Pty) Ltd 1998 (3) SA 956 
(SCA) at 960E-F; (1998) 19 ILJ 1033 (SCA) at 1037D; SA Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union  
v Irvin & Johnson Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 2302 (LAC) at 2314I-2315A; Benicon Group v National Union of 
Metalworkers of SA  (1999) 20 ILJ 2777 (SCA) at 2779I and 2787D. 
47  See, for example, Media Workers Association of SA v Press Corporation of SA Ltd 1992 (4) SA 791 (A) 
at 798H-I. 
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industrial tribunal must determine whether or not that dismissal was fair. These reasons may 
relate to pregnancy.  
 
In Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd,48 the 
court found that “fairness” was a means of sorting permissible from impermissible 
discrimination. In considering what constitutes “unfairness” in discrimination cases under 
labour law, the court stated: 
 
“The Act provides two complete defences to unfair discrimination on any of the 
prohibited grounds. By virtue of item 2(2)(b), if the inherent requirements of a job justify 
an act of discrimination, this is a complete defence to an unfair discrimination claim in 
terms of item 2(1) (a). Affirmative action measures that satisfy the requirements of item 
2(2)(c) also provide a complete defence to unfair discrimination ... Discrimination is 
unfair if it is reprehensible in terms of the society’s prevailing norms. Whether or not 
society will tolerate the discrimination depends on what the object is of the 
discrimination and the means used to achieve it. The object must be legitimate and the 
means proportional and rational.” 
 
The court therefore found that there was no “objective” justification for the discrimination 
perpetrated by the employer in that matter. 
 
In Whitehead, the Labour Court, dealing directly with the issue held that there was room for a 
more general defence. In determining unfairness it relied on the following elements: 
 
“(i) the impact of the discrimination on the complainant; (ii) the position of the complainant 
in society; (iii) the nature and the extent of the discrimination; (iv) whether the 
discrimination has a legitimate purpose and to what extent it achieves that purpose; (v) 
whether there are less disadvantageous means to achieve the purpose; (vi) whether and to 
what extent the respondent has taken reasonable steps to address the disadvantage caused 
by the discrimination, or to accommodate diversity.” 
 
All these factors, assessed objectively, will assist in giving “precision and elaboration” to the 
Constitutional test of unfairness. They do not, however, constitute a closed list. Whether the 
courts were correct in relying on criteria other than those raised by the two specific defences 
is, of course, a separate issue. The central problem with a ‘general’ or residual defence or 
justification is the determination of what constitutes a “legitimate” object.   
 
                                                 
48  (1997) 11 BLLR 1438 (LC). The case, decided in terms of the LRA, dealt with alleged racial 
discrimination as well as alleged discrimination on an ‘arbitrary’ ground. 
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4.2 THE GENERAL FAIRNESS DEFENCE 
 
The Constitutional Court has indicated which factors ought to be analyzed in the unfairness 
enquiry in terms of section 9 of the Constitution. In Harksen v Lane NO,49 the court listed the 
following: 
 
(i) the position of the complainant in society; 
 
(ii) the nature of the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it; and 
 
(iii) the extent to which the discrimination has affected the rights of the complainants and 
whether it has led to an impairment of their fundamental dignity. 
 
The Labour Court has laid down one approach to a “general defence” to claims of 
discrimination and the defence was partly formulated as follows: 
 
“Discrimination is unfair if it is reprehensible in terms of the society’s prevailing norms. 
Whether or not society will tolerate the discrimination depends on what the object is of 
the discrimination and the means used to achieve it. The object must be legitimate and the 
means proportional and rational.” 
 
The Labour Court also requires that an investigation into the group that suffered the 
discrimination, the effect of the discrimination on that group, and the power in terms of which 
the discrimination was effected.50 
 
4.3 INHERENT REQUIREMENTS OF THE JOB 
 
Apart from discrimination that is based on advancing those previously disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination (ie affirmative action), legislation also permits discrimination based on 
the “inherent requirements of the job”. This implies that the job itself must have some 
indispensable attribute which must relate in an inescapable way to performing of the job 
required. Getting a job done within a prescribed period could well be an inherent job 
requirement. But to succeed on this ground a party relying thereon must satisfy the Court that 
                                                 
49  [1997] (11) BCLR 1489 (CC). 
50  Dingler 295 B-C (ILJ); 1448E (BLLR). 
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the time was of the essence. In Woolworths supra, this defence was resorted to by the 
company as a last-ditch stand. However, the Court was not sympathetic. 
 
Inherent requirements of the job’ it is suggested, are limited to fixed attributes of a job, those 
that are permanent in nature. In Whitehead, the Labour Court added that the concept of 
inherent requirement implies that an indispensable attribute must be job related and to suggest 
that the requirement as in the case, of interrupted job continuity is an inherent job requirement 
is to distort the very concept. According to the Court, if the job can be performed without the 
requirement, then it cannot be said that the requirement is inherent and therefore protected 
under the Act.  
 
With regard to job continuity it is doubtful whether the continuity requirement could fairly be 
regarded as an inherent requirement of the job. It could not be one since it would in terms of 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 be unlawful to make it a condition of 
employment that an employee might not take maternity leave (section 25), sick leave (section 
22), annual leave (section 20) or family responsibility leave (section 27). Accordingly, the 
requirement of uninterrupted job continuity in itself should not justify a refusal to employ an 
applicant on the grounds of her pregnancy. 
 
4.4 ONUS OF PROOF 
 
The Constitution provides as follows: 
 
“(4) Prima facie proof of discrimination on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) 
shall be presumed to be sufficient proof of unfair discrimination as contemplated in that 
subsection, until the contrary is established.” 
 
In our labour law, the temptation is great to decide an unfair discrimination case based on 
pregnancy or reasons related to her pregnancy according to the question of onus. Section 11 
of the Act provides that “whenever unfair discrimination is alleged in terms of this Act, the 
employer against whom the allegation is made must establish that it is fair”. The use of the 
word “alleged” indicates that the evidentiary burden upon the applicant to establish a prima 
facie case has been reduced. The applicant must at very least “allege” sufficient facts from 
which an inference of unfair discrimination can be drawn’ before the onus shifts to the 
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employer to prove that the discrimination is not unfair.51 The LRA on the other hand, does not 
prescribe the standard of proof required and there has been very little debate in the decisions 
as to what this should be.  
 
It is therefore not surprising that the issue regarding the onus of proof will always and 
immediately come to the fore. For example, the subjective intent on the part of an employee 
inherent in an allegation of automatically unfair dismissal may be difficult to prove. The onus 
(what we in South Africa would term an evidentiary burden) in English law rests on the 
employee to show that the reason for the dismissal was a prohibited one.52 B Perrins et al 
Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law53 suggest that the English statutory 
provisions do not require the employee to prove that the reason for the dismissal was 
pregnancy or a connected reason and draws an analogy with the requirements relating to 
redundancy in Maund v Penwith District Council.54 Lord Justice Griffiths of the Court of 
Appeal held at 149 as follows: 
 
“It is not for the employee to prove the reason for his dismissal, but merely to produce 
evidence sufficient to raise the issue or, to put it another way, that raises some doubt 
about the reason for the dismissal. Once this evidential burden is discharged, the onus 
remains upon the employer to prove the reason for the dismissal.” 
 
In Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd,55 the 
Labour Court held that the requirement that the applicant should prove not only the fact of 
differential treatment but also its unfairness could present applicants with serious and possibly 
insurmountable difficulties since, by its nature, proof of unfairness might only appear from 
evidence to which an employee or work seeker will have no access. Referring also to section 
8 of the interim Constitution the court concluded that the burden of proving fairness should 
likewise shift to the respondent once the applicant had proved an act of discrimination.  
 
In Ntai v South African Breweries Ltd56 the court stated that once an applicant proves 
discrimination on a listed ground, the onus shifts to the employer to prove that such 
discrimination is fair. A mere allegation of discrimination, it was held, is not sufficient to 
                                                 
51  Du Toit et al Labour Law Through the Cases EEA-31-32. 
52  See Bourne and Whitmore Race and Sex Discrimination (1993) at para 10.13. 
53  Vol 2 J408. 
54  [1884] ICR 143. 
55  Supra. 
56  (2001) 2 BLLR 186 (LC). 
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establish a prima facie case,57 where the employer remains silent, a negative inference may be 
drawn.  
 
In Middleton v Industrial Chemical Carriers (Pty) Ltd58 it was held that if discrimination is on 
a specified ground then the complainant must prove that the differentiation amounts to 
discrimination, which is unfair. 
 
In the final analysis, an inference of discrimination could only be proved if it was consistent 
with all the proven facts and was the “most probable” inference to be drawn59 and that is, the 
inference should be acceptable, plausible, suitable or credible. In Louw v Golden Arrow Bus 
Services (Pty) Ltd60 the court rejected the “three-phase” approach as laid down in Mc Donnell 
Douglas Corp v Green.61.  
 
4.5 THE FAIRNESS OF THE DISMISSAL 
 
The question, which arises, is whether or not the employee had been automatically unfairly 
dismissed as a consequence of her pregnancy or any reason related to her pregnancy. Once it 
was common cause that the employee’s pregnancy had operated against her, the employer 
would become burdened with an evidentiary onus which would oblige it to present evidence 
to persuade the court of the merit of its case. Such evidentiary onus arise from the 
circumstance that, since the facts relating to the justification for the discrimination would 
peculiarly be within the knowledge of the employer, the complainant may need only to 
adduce less evidence to establish a prima facie case.62 The motivation for the discrimination 
should therefore at best be adequately revealed. 
 
4.6 CAUSATION 
 
4.6.1 Causation is important to attribute liability for the acts complained of. In order to show a 
nexus between the conduct complained of and the potential prejudicial results, an 
interventionist objective approach is largely required. This means that there must be a 
                                                 
57  At 218; see also Transport and General Workers Union v Bayete Holdings (1999) 20 ILJ 1117 (LC). 
58  (2001) 22 ILJ 472 (LC). 
59  Cf  Tsetsana v Blyvooruitzicht Gold Mining Co Ltd (1999) 4 BLLR 404 (LC). 
60  (2000) 3 BLLR 311 (LC), 
61  411 US792 [at par 58]. 
62  Gericke v Sack l978 (1) SA 821(A) at 827 D-G. 
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convergence of and a linkage between separate and distinct elements before legal 
consequences can arise. The reason for the dismissal could essentially be one of causation. If 
a certain fact (taking into account the applicant’s pregnancy) is not the reason or cause or 
conditio sine qua non (or prerequisite) for the dismissal or the decision not to employ her.  Put 
another way, would the dismissal have occurred if there was no realisation of the employee‘s 
pregnancy or reasons related to her? If the answer is yes, then the dismissal was not 
automatically unfair. If the answer is no, that does not however immediately render the 
dismissal automatically unfair.  
 
The next issue is one of legal causation, namely whether such pregnancy or reasons relating to 
her pregnancy was the main or dominant, or proximate, or most likely cause of the dismissal. 
There are no hard and fast rules to determine the question of legal causation. Only if the test 
of legal causation shows that the most probable cause for the dismissal was as a result of the 
employee’s pregnancy or reasons related to her pregnancy, then it can be said that the 
dismissal was automatically unfair in terms of section 187(1)(a) . If that probable inference 
cannot be drawn, the enquiry proceeds a step further. A further question to be asked is 
whether a particular employee would have been given the job if it was not because of her 
pregnancy or any reasons related to her pregnancy. 
 
4.6.2 In Mashava,63 the applicant concealed her pregnancy for some time, but made the 
disclosure when she realised that other members of staff had noticed her condition. Her 
articles were subsequently terminated. The applicant claimed that her dismissal was 
automatically unfair. The respondent contended that the applicant had not been dismissed and 
that the contract was terminated because the applicant had been deceitful, not because she was 
pregnant. The respondent had further contended that the primary reason for the dismissal was 
not the applicant’s pregnancy, but the fact that she had dishonestly sought to conceal it. The 
question which the Court had to decide was whether the applicant’s alleged deceit could be 
separated from her pregnancy. The Court per Landman J held that 
 
“The applicant had discharged the onus of proving that the respondent knew she was pregnant 
and that the applicant had given good reasons for her reluctance to disclose her condition … the 
applicant’s duty to disclose her condition had to be measured against her right to privacy as an 
employee is not obliged to disclose that she is pregnant during her probationary period.” 
 
                                                 
63  Supra. 
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4.6.3 In Woolworths64 the issue of causation arose with some force in the case. Ms Whitehead 
was, according to the majority of the Labour Appeal Court, unable to show that, but for her 
pregnancy, she would have been appointed to the position. The Court found that the reason 
for Ms Whitehead’s non-appointment was not casually connected but was as a result of some 
other considerable factors. The result of therefore was that, there was no causal connection 
between her not being appointed and her pregnancy. The majority further held that though it 
is true that her pregnancy was taken into account against her but there was no evidence that, if 
it had not been taken into account, she would necessarily have been appointed.  
 
4.7 JOB CONTINUITY 
 
Pregnant women may vary in the degree to which they can cope with the pressures of the 
workplace, but one characteristic they inevitably share both in fact and in law is that they 
must stop working during their confinement and for some time thereafter. So, a requirement 
of continuity of employment inevitably discriminates against all pregnant women. Time can 
never be shown to be of the essence in an indefinite-period contract, however pressing the 
particular task the employee is assigned. In Whitehead,65 the Court noted that Ms Whitehead 
was not specifically employed to carry out a finite task. This is why the Court said, and 
rightly so, that one cannot ever say that a person is not suited to a position because of the 
possibility, or in this case the certainty, of a future absence. This is why Woolworths failed to 
persuade the Court that its conscious decision to turn Ms Whitehead down for the permanent 
position against her because she was pregnant was not precisely what it was: discrimination 
against her because she was pregnant.   
 
The fact is that, short of avoiding the condition altogether, mothers to-be are ineluctably faced 
with confinement and at least a period of recuperation and the duties of early motherhood.  
 
4.7.1 IMPOSSIBLE GUARANTEE OF JOB CONTINUITY 
 
In Whitehead,66 Woolworths professed to accept the principle that pregnant employees should 
be protected against discrimination. It contended, however, that one who was not yet an 
                                                 
64  Supra. 
65  Supra. 
66  Supra. 
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employee should be treated differently, at least when the position required an initial period of 
continuous attendance at work. This is why it relied on operational reasons to support its 
argument. However, according to the court, it was not for the employer to propose that, 
because there are facts upon which it could rely to arrive at a decision to discriminate, the 
court was bound to accept its decision. The first question the court had to consider was 
whether the requirement of continuous employment was objectively justifiable. In Judge 
Waglay’s view, it was not. He came to this conclusion by applying what may be termed a 
foreseeability test which he formulated in this way: 
 
“In determining whether or not the discrimination complained of is based on an arbitrary 
ground a good yardstick to measure whether or not discrimination is based on an arbitrary 
ground is to determine whether the discrimination is such that it can be sustained 
irrespective of the happening or non happening of any unforeseen event.”  
 
According to the test, the requirement of continuous employment is reasonable only if the 
incumbent would, ‘no matter what fate befalls him or her to continue with his or her 
employment uninterrupted for at least 12 months. The Court further remarked that no 
employer can receive any guarantee that an incumbent will remain in its employ for an 
uninterrupted period of time. In the absence of such guarantee, the court was satisfied that to 
place that such a requirement can be no more than a decision arrived at on an arbitrary 
ground.   
 
In the court’s view, if profitability is to dictate whether or not discrimination is unfair, it 
would negate the very essence for the need of a Bill of Rights. However on appeal, Willis JA 
disagreed and held that employers must base their commercial decisions on reasonable 
probabilities and risk-taking is intrinsic to enterprise. Risk is discounted, inter alia, by an 
evaluation of probabilities. 
 
Imagine for a moment that the incumbent who has satisfied the respondent that he is able to 
remain in its employ for the uninterrupted period of 12 months, renders exceptional services 
for a period of 6 months, and is then involved in an accident or is taken unexpectedly ill and is 
unable to perform his duties for a period of 3 months. What happens in that case? Does the 
respondent dismiss him? Does the respondent continue to employ the incumbent after he has 
recuperated? Does either of these options not make nonsense of the requirement of 
uninterrupted job continuity? 
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In the result, it is submitted that Judge Waglay is unquestionably correct when he says that the 
vagaries of fate are such that any employee may possibly fall victim to circumstances that 
prevent him or her from rendering service for such periods. However, there is a contrary 
argument that it does not follow logically that, because one cannot foresee what fate may dish 
up to any employee, one is acting unreasonably by judging the suitability of a candidate when 
one knows what it will certainly dish up. For example, when Ms Whitehead accepted the 
permanent appointment with Woolworths, her fate was, so to speak, sealed. She knew that she 
would have to stop work within a certain number of months. So did Woolworths which, for 
purely operational reasons, decided not to take her on for that reason. Logically, there seem to 
be nothing unreasonable about this reasoning.  
 
4.8 PROFITABILITY, COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND FAIRNESS 
 
4.8.1 PROFITABILITY AS A DICTATOR 
 
In the Labour Court’s opinion, profitability is not important, but equity is paramount. It would 
probably be more accurate to say that the evaluation of what is fair or unfair in the workplace 
must be conducted with an eye on economic reality. This, after all, is the only way one can 
justify such otherwise inherently indefensible conduct as paying one employee more than 
another, not according to his or her needs, but according to the employers’ assessment of the 
importance of his or her work.  
 
In Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council & others v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd67 
the court said that one is precluded from measuring the fairness or unfairness of 
discrimination “against profitability or for that matter efficiency of a business enterprise”.  To 
some, this observation may seem difficult to reconcile with the purpose of advancing 
economic development. The principle that considerations of profitability and efficiency of the 
employer‘s actions vis-à-vis its employees is, perhaps, too widely stated.  
 
In Woolworths68 Willis JA conceded that profitability is not to dictate whether or not 
discrimination is unfair. He however nevertheless held that profitability is a relevant 
                                                 
67  Supra. 
68  Supra. 
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consideration and if the Labour Courts were to make their decisions entirely indifferent to 
profitability, the consequences for our society would be disastrous. The learned judge was of 
the view that profitability of the employer‘s business and the pregnancy of a prospective 
employee are “perfectly rational and commercially understandable considerations”. 
 
4.8.2 COMMERCIAL RATIONALE 
 
Numerous court decisions, have accepted commercial rationale as a measure, however, the 
Labour Court in the Woolworths case was most dismissive of this argument. The legislature 
has not given the Court or arbitrators the right to impose moral principles that are 
economically and operationally irrational, save to the extent that legislation requires them to 
do so. The Constitution and the labour legislation have to place limits on the employer‘s right 
to decide for itself what is economically rational. While outlawing unfair discrimination, the 
legislature has been fairly careful to give employers a right to discriminate for legitimate 
reasons. Thus, it has created exceptions. If allegedly discriminatory conduct is found to be 
based on bona fide business reasons or has a bona fide commercial rationale, any potential 
casual link between such conduct and a prohibited ground of discrimination is severed. This 
defence has been considered in a number of cases as a justification demonstrating an absence 
of unfairness on the part of the employer.  Differing standards have been adopted for 
accepting the defence: 
 
A stricter test was adopted in Ntai v South African Breweries Ltd69 where the court eschewed 
“mere” commercial rationale as a relevant criterion in determining unfairness and adopted, 
instead, a test “more akin to business necessity”. This brings the standard of the test to that of 
the defence of an inherent requirement for the job and has the advantage of setting a clearer 
standard. 
 
In Kadiaka v Amalgamated Beverage Industries,70 the inquiry in casu was whether the ground 
for discrimination was arbitrary. The Court held that in order to suffice as a defence, 
commercial rationale must be of sufficient magnitude that it outweighed the rights of the job 
seeker and is not morally offensive. According to the Court, the discrimination must be 
                                                 
69  [2001] 21 ILJ 196 (LC). 
70  (1999) 20 ILJ 373 (LC). 
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balanced against societal values, particularly the dignity of the complainant and a society 
based on equality and the absence of discrimination.  
 
The Labour Court in Whitehead rejected altogether the notion that commercial rationale could 
negate unfairness. Waglay J held “it would negate the very essence for the need of a Bill of 
Rights”. According to this view, the fundamental rights of the individual will seemingly 
always trump commercial considerations. 
 
The most flexible of these was proffered by Willis JA in Woolworths,71 where the fact that the 
employer had taken into account “perfectly rational and commercially understandable 
considerations” which were neither trivial nor insubstantial was considered an adequate 
defence against a claim of discrimination on the listed ground of sex. However, in terms of 
this standard, it would seem, almost any commercially rational reason would suffice as a 
defence. The Labour Appeal Court appeared to have suggested that if an employer can show 
that its operational needs are of much importance to the extreme, it may fairly discriminate an 
employee for reasons related to her pregnancy. Though this was not the only decisive factor in 
the case, however it is undoubtedly clear that it weighed heavily against Ms Whitehead. Also 
alarming is the differentiation that was made between more senior and junior female 
employees.  
 
Willis JA held that 
 
“it is a simple matter for an employer to accommodate the pregnancy of the shelf-packer 
in a supermarket, the waitress in a restaurant, the receptionist at an hotel, the seamstress 
working on the production line of a clothing factory. It is not difficult to accommodate 
the pregnancy of women in the numerous lowly paid, dreary and routine jobs with which 
women, especially, are burdened. When it comes to executive positions of critical 
importance, the consequences go beyond imposing a burden on employers. They impact 
negatively on the capacity of the economy, as a whole, to grow and, in so doing, its 
capacity to create new jobs … To find that the pregnancy of a prospective employee 
cannot be taken into account in deciding whether or not to offer her employment may 
seem to be fair to prospective employees but it would certainly be unfair to employers 
and society as a whole and, by reason of the damaging consequences of such a finding 
upon society as a whole, ultimately unfair to prospective employees as well. After all, 
prospective employees need jobs to apply for in the first place”. 
 
                                                 
71  Supra. 
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In conclusion, it is greatly noted that the existence of such widely disparate standards is 
clearly unsatisfactory for both employers and employees seeking clarity as to their rights. 
Unless commercial rationale as a factor justifying differential treatment is rigorously 
qualified, it is an easy standard to meet and, if allowed to trump the rights of employees, 
would undermine the purpose of the Act. It is therefore submitted that the legitimate interests 
of the employer should be weighed against the impact of its conduct on the employee’s rights 
and interests. This would prevent the wholesale acceptance of commercial rationale at the 
expense of the dignity of the individual. 
 
4.9 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
The purpose of the Labour Relations Act, amongst others, is to advance economic 
development. Fairness in the employment context must self-evidently be linked to the ultimate 
purpose for which employers exist and create and maintain jobs. We live in a country with 
pervasive poverty, poor social security, high unemployment and a low growth rate.   
 
In Woolworths, Willis JA referred to the economic position and the great poverty in South 
Africa and concluded that at this stage of the country’s history; to hold that an employer 
cannot take into account a prospective employee’s pregnancy would be widely regarded as 
being so economically irrational as to be fundamentally harmful to the South African society. 
According to the learned judge, when it comes to executive positions of critical importance, 
the consequences go beyond imposing a burden on employers as they impact negatively on 
the capacity of the economy, as a whole, to grow and, in so doing, its capacity to create new 
jobs. The judge stated that it would be inappropriate for the court to deliver a judgment as 
though it were cocooned in the intellectual and moral parameters of a rich, first world country. 
It would be inappropriate to ignore the fact that, as a general rule, the existence of elites can 
only be justified if they produce a dividend for society that exceeds the costs which they 
incur.  
 
With the above in mind, it is therefore unclear whether preference should be given to the 
purpose of the act or to the Constitutional general provision of section 27. For obvious 
reasons, the latter is to prevail as it is a product of the supreme law in the country. This is 
what the Labour Appeal Court ought to have seriously considered by finding that Ms 
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Whitehead’s fundamental right not to be discriminated against on the basis of her pregnancy 
should not have been equated against the issue of economic development. 
 
A close scrutiny and analysis of the remarks of Willis JA therefore indicates that what the 
Court encourages is that female pregnant employees should rather not disclose the status of 
their pregnancy during job interviews as that may weigh heavily against, but they should 
instead disclose after being offered employment as they would not suffer any financial 
consequences in that regard.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CASE LAW CONTRIBUTION 
 
5.1 DOMESTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
 
In the few years that have passed since the inception of the LRA, few cases from the Labour 
Court dealt with the impact of the Bill of Fundamental Rights on pregnancy dismissal law. A 
few number of labour law cases emanating from the Industrial Court and the Labour Court 
have also attempted to deal with the fairness of a dismissal of an employee dismissed for 
reasons related to her pregnancy. However, there has not yet been any Constitutional Court 
case to date dealing with the pregnancy aspect within the context of a dismissal dispute.  
 
5.1.1 In Randall v Progress Knitting Textiles,72 the Industrial Court, per Grobler AM, dealing 
with a case involving the dismissal of a pregnant woman held as follows: 
 
“In turning to the second question, that is, whether the company could have terminated 
the applicant’s services unilaterally in terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 
one has to look at the prevailing circumstances in the company itself and not only at the 
Act. Whilst the Act governs the conditions of employment and indeed makes allowances 
for acting in the way the company had acted, the company may not rely on this Act under 
the prevailing circumstances in view of the precedent it has set previously, as this would 
have resulted in the selective application of the Act, which in turn would have amounted 
to a severe discrimination against the applicant.” 
 
5.1.2 In Mnguni v Gumbi73 the court found that, when an employer dismissed an employee on 
the grounds of pregnancy, he was obliged to apply the guidelines applicable to dismissals for 
medical incapacity. In that matter, the respondent knew that the applicant was pregnant and 
was due for maternity leave the following week. However, when she complained that she was 
tired, he reacted angrily, physically pushing her out of the surgery and telling her not to return 
to work. The court found that this kind of treatment of an employee was outrageous and no 
longer had a place in this country and further that the Constitution guaranteed the employee’s 
right to fair labour practices. 
 
                                                 
72  Supra. 
73  (2004) 25 ILJ 715 (LC). 
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5.1.3 The leading authority regarding the issue of pregnancy dismissal is the controversial 
case of Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead.74 The continuity requirement was the defence 
pleaded by Woolworths in the Labour Court. In the context of resisting Ms Whitehead’s 
(failed) claim that she had actually been appointed to the post, Woolworths pleaded that it 
would not have appointed her when it was alleged to have done so since other candidates 
were yet to be interviewed.  
 
In the Labour Court, Wagaly J held Woolworths had been less than frank about its professed 
belief that continuity of employment was a prerequisite to the requirements of the post. Nor 
had Woolworths warned Ms Whitehead that her impending confinement would be a bar to her 
obtaining the post on a permanent basis during the initial negotiations.  
 
On appeal, three separate judgments were delivered by the Labour Appeal Court. The Labour 
Appeal Court (LAC), by a majority, (per Zondo AJP and Willis JA; Conradie JA dissenting) 
upheld Woolworths’ appeal. The Labour Appeal Court said that the reason for taking her 
pregnancy into account was operational in that any incumbent would have to provide 
Woolworths with uninterrupted continuity of employment for a period of at least twelve 
months. The respondent could not fulfill this requirement as a result of her pregnancy. She 
would have had to take three months’ maternity leave after only five months in the post. 
Accordingly, it was held that there was “no casual connection between Ms Whitehead not 
being appointed and her pregnancy”.75  
 
As to the continuity requirement, Zondo AJP reasoned somewhat equivocally that it was not a 
sufficient ground “on its own to justify the decision not to appoint Ms Whitehead” The 
learned went on to comment that 
 
“the appointment of a candidate who would have had to be away three months into the 
job would cause the appellant no more than some inconvenience and some amount of 
disruption but such disruption would not be of such a serious nature on its own as to 
justify not appointing such a candidate on that ground alone”.76 
 
Faced with such superior competition, it was said, in the alternative, Ms Whitehead would not 
have been appointed to the post even if she had not been pregnant. The most likely 
                                                 
74  Supra. 
75  At para 24. 
76  At para 26. 
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construction to be placed on the above dictum is that the learned judge was not suggesting 
that the continuity requirement could not in principle constitute a substantial defence to 
discrimination, but rather on the facts of the case, no such requirement had been proved. 
 
Conradie JA held that 
 
“[t]he respondent had failed to demonstrate that ‘the continuity requirement’ was 
operationally so important that it would have been unreasonable to expect of the 
appellant to employ the respondent”.77  
 
The learned judge held that although the continuity requirement may have been desirable, it 
was not of pressing operational significance. Conradie JA therefore found for Ms Whitehead 
on the basis that she had been refused the post directly on account of her pregnancy. 
 
Willis JA in his colourful judgment adopted the following style and held as follows: 
 
“It is a paradox of the human condition that the noblest of our aspirations are often in 
conflict. In this regard, the ideals of freedom and equality have been the giants that have 
bestrode the stage in modern times. In this case, certain derivatives of the ideals of 
freedom and equality have clashed with complex intensity. On the one hand there is the 
ideal of maximizing economic rationality in order to increase the prosperity and hence 
the freedom of our society. On the other, there is the ideal of minimizing those 
disadvantages that women experience as a result of pregnancy in order that we may come 
closer to a state of equality between women and men. … In this matter, obviously, a 
decision has to be made. I am conscious, however, that whatever decision this court 
arrives at will have an imperfect result. I hope, however, that this decision reflects an 
endeavour to accommodate our ideals as a society within the constraints of our times and 
circumstances.”78  
 
Willis JA disagreed that the employer acted unreasonably. On the contrary, he held that 
Woolworths took into account “perfectly rational and commercially understandable 
considerations”79 and the said considerations were in the circumstances, according to the 
judge, neither trivial nor insubstantial. This was considered an adequate defence against a 
claim of discrimination in that matter. Essentially, the learned judge upheld the appeal on the 
basis that the applicant‘s non-appointment was due to a combination of two factors: namely, 
she was not the best candidate and could not fulfill the continuity requirement.  
 
                                                 
77  At para 48. 
78  At paras. 55-57. 
79  At para 131. 
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A perusal of these judgements leaves no doubt that labour law and labour relations areas will 
be the subject of continual constitutional interpretation and challenge, if the number of 
decided cases where the impact of the present Bill of Fundamental Rights on aspects of labour 
law came into play is anything to go by.80 The Labour Court matter in Whitehead made 
inroads into the role of the court in the adjudication of matters in so far as this related to 
considerations of equity. The case led the way in enabling the court to make a moral judgment 
which extends beyond mere questions of law.  
 
5.2 FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Fundamental ILO Conventions On equality 
 
In 1944, the ILO’s Constitution and mandate was refreshed by the Declaration of 
Philadelphia. Among other things, it affirmed that all human beings, irrespective of race, 
creed or sex, have the right to pursue their material well-being and their spiritual development 
in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity. The 
Discrimination Convention (Employment and Occupation)81 calls for a national policy to 
eliminate discrimination in access to employment, training and working conditions, on 
grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin and 
to promote equality of opportunity and treatment. Discrimination is defined any distinction, 
exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction or social origin (or any other motive determined by the state concerned) which has 
the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or 
occupation. The scope of the Convention covers access to vocational training, access to 
employment and to particular occupations, and terms and conditions of employment.  
 
According to the ILO Report of the Committee of Experts,82 in Germany women are allowed 
to leave their employment for a period of up to five years for the purpose of raising a child, 
without losing their seniority and right to promotion. This would be unthinkable in South 
Africa at the moment. We are not that desperate to encourage the arrival of new citizens. In 
                                                 
80  See Olivier “Fundamental Rights and Labour Law: Some recent developments” (1996) De Rebus 436 and 
668. 
81  Convention 1958 (No.111) 
82  Supra. 
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the matter of Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd,83 the ECJ gave as one of its most important 
reasons for its decision, the need to encourage women to have children. This is hardly the 
situation in South Africa.  
 
In that matter of Webb,84 the ECJ gave its preliminary ruling in which it held that: 
 
“Dismissal of a pregnant woman recruited for an indefinite period cannot be justified on 
grounds related to her inability to fulfill a fundamental condition of her employment 
contract.” 
 
It went on to say that 
 
“the protection afforded by Community law to a woman during pregnancy and after 
childbirth cannot be dependent on whether her presence at work during maternity is 
essential to the proper functioning of the undertaking in which she is employed.” 
 
In para 12 the ECJ held as follows:  
 
“[I]t should be observed that only women can be refused employment on the ground of 
pregnancy and such a refusal therefore constitutes direct discrimination on the ground of 
sex. A refusal of employment on account of the financial consequences of absence due to 
pregnancy must be regarded as based, essentially, on the fact of pregnancy. Such 
discrimination cannot be justified on grounds relating to the financial loss which an 
employer who appointed a pregnant woman would suffer for the duration of her 
maternity leave.” 
 
The ECJ had, however, to interpret Articles 2 and 3 of the Council Directive of 9 February 
197685 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion and working conditions. 
Article 2(1) of Directive provides: 
 
“The principle of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no discrimination 
whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to 
marital or family status.” 
 
                                                 
83  C-32/93 [1994] IRLR 482. 
84  Supra. 
85  76/207/EEC. 
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Article 3(1) provides: 
 
“Application of the principle of equal treatment means that there shall be no 
discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex in the conditions, including selection 
criteria, for access to all jobs or posts ...” 
 
A careful reading of the speech of Lord Keith of Kinkel, with which his four other judges 
agreed, reveals a rather more complex evaluation of the issue than the first glance at this 
single sentence quoted by Marcus AJ would suggest.  
 
Their Lordships considered the preliminary ruling of the ECJ in the Dekker case86 and 
nevertheless decided, in turn, to refer the issue before them to the ECJ for another preliminary 
ruling. They were concerned as follows::  
 
“The European Court did not, in Dekker’s case and the Hertz case, have to consider the 
situation where a woman, on account of her pregnancy, will not be able to carry out, at 
the time when her services are required, the particular job for which she is applying or for 
which she has been engaged. The two decisions do not give any clear indication whether 
in such a situation the court would regard the fundamental reason for the refusal to 
engage the woman or for dismissing her as being her unavailability for the job and not 
her pregnancy.” 
 
In the matter of Webb, the ECJ gave its preliminary ruling in which it held as follows: 
 
“Dismissal of a pregnant woman recruited for an indefinite period cannot be justified on 
grounds related to her inability to fulfill a fundamental condition of her employment 
contract."  It went on to say that: “the protection afforded by Community law to a woman 
during pregnancy and after childbirth cannot be dependent on whether her presence at 
work during maternity is essential to the proper functioning of the undertaking in which 
she is employed.” 
 
                                                 
86  Supra. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
Experience elsewhere has shown that the impact of constitutional provisions on labour law 
and industrial relations, in particular those provisions embodied in a Bill of Fundamental 
Rights, should not be underestimated87. South Africa, at present, does not have the levels of 
affluence, the low birthrates, and same highly developed insurance systems that, inter alia, 
make decisions such as that in the Dekker case easily absorbable in the social fabric that exists 
in Europe. Section 17(6) of the old Basic Conditions of Employment88 provided as follows:    
'No employer shall require or permit any female employee to work during the period commencing four 
weeks prior to the expected date of her confinement and ending eight weeks after the date of her 
confinement.' 
 
The prohibition under s 17(6) of the old BCEA was absolute. Failure to comply with this 
section exposed the employer to criminal prosecution in terms of s 25(e) of the old. This Act 
did not oblige the employer to pay the female employee any wages during this period of 
confinement.  
 
In terms of s 13(6)(c) of the old BCEA, incapacity meant inability to work owing to any 
sickness or injury other than sickness or injury caused by the employee's own misconduct. 
Therefore maternity leave could not be classified as sick leave. Such employee qualified for 
maternity benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act 30 of 1966. These benefits 
amounted to 45% of the employee's normal earnings for a minimum period of six months89.  
 
The Industrial Court in Randall's case softened the blow for the pregnant working women  to 
some degree by requiring the employer to justify the dismissal by showing that it would be 
prejudiced if it were to keep a pregnant employee's job open to her during her maternity leave. 
Viewed in the context of comparative jurisprudence, our law in this sphere was undoubtedly 
seriously lagging90. It is therefore not surprising to note that the legislature has seen fit to 
make rapid statutory interventions. Among them are the following:            
 
                                                 
87 Kahn-Freund “The Impact of Constitutions on Labour Law” 1976 Cambridge Law Journal 240; Beatty 
“Consititutional labour Rights: Pros and Cons (1993) ILJ 1)”. 
88 Act 3 of 1983. 
89 Ss 34 and 37 of this Act. 
90  See for example Janet Kentridge 'Banking on Maternity Leave' (1994) 15 ILJ 1205-6. 
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6.1 The New Basic Conditions of Employment Act91 
 
Contrary to the old BCEA, the status of a pregnant employee is set out in clear terms by the 
new BCEA. Firstly the new BCEA regards the absence during the period of confinement as 
leave. Secondly, before the employee takes leave, she must make arrangements with the 
employer as to when the maternity leave will commence and when it will end.   In terms of s 
87(1) of the new BCEA, the Minister must issue a “Code of Good Practice on the Protection 
of Employees during Pregnancy and after the Birth of the Child”. 
 
6.2 Maternity leave 
 
The BCEA does not provide for maternity pay. Maternity benefits continue to be regulated by 
the Unemployment Insurance Act (“UIA”)92. A pregnant employee who is a contributor to the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund is entitled to receive maternity benefits in terms of the UIA. 
Any maternity benefit paid to the employee from another source, including a collective 
agreement or contract of employment, must be deducted from the statutory benefit93. 
Maternity benefits can be paid up to a maximum period of 17, 32 weeks. On the other hand an 
employee who has a miscarriage during the third trimester or who bears a stillborn child is 
entitled to maternity benefit for a maximum of six weeks after the miscarriage or stillbirth. 
Unlike the previous UIA, which set benefits at a fixed rate of 45% of earnings, the new 
system favours lower-paid workers by laying down a sliding scale of benefits based on 
monthly remuneration. 
                                                 
91 Act 75 of 1997. 
92 UIA 63 of 2001 and the Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act 4 of 2002. 
93 S 24(2) and (3), UIA. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
Transforming our society and all institutions is not negotiable, neither is it a luxury. It is an 
important imperative. The patriarchal nature of our society ensures that women‘s talents and 
their skills are not immediately recognised. Pregnancy discrimination and dismissal it’s a bad 
sad saga that should not be allowed to be swept under the carpet. Pregnant employees could 
be victims of the highest order of sexism. This is what the cancer of sexism does to women. It 
damages them psychologically and fuels self-doubt and low esteem. Many pregnant 
employees have seen their careers destroyed because employers have treated them in a 
discriminatory way. Pregnant women go through workplace hell everyday of their lives, and 
their fault or “sin” is simply to have been born women and they are therefore being punished 
for something over which they have no control. This leaves lifelong emotional scars that its 
victims must carry. Our society must wake up to the reality of resistance to equality/ 
discrimination by those who have benefited from all forms of oppression. Discrimination 
should be our number one enemy if we are to live up to the vision of those who paid the 
ultimate price of creating this democracy. 
 
The express prohibition of unfair discrimination, contained in the Constitution, the Labour 
Relations Act (“the LRA”), the Employment Equity Act (the EEA”)and the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair discrimination Act (PEPUDA), has generated substantially 
more legal activity in this area in a short period of time. There has been notable consistent 
precedent discouraging the unfair dismissal of pregnant employees from the end of 1999 to 
the beginning of 2000. This period experienced for example, the introduction of perfectly 
commercial justifiable reasons as a rational basis to justify discriminatory acts related to 
pregnancy. This was done when the courts through the passage of time, made significant 
decisions of precedent value in developing pregnancy dismissal jurisprudence.  
 
One could however say that the level of uncertainty that was achieved in pregnancy dismissal 
law jurisprudence has not been an absolute smooth process. At least in one occasion it was 
characterised by a divided judgment in the Labour Appeal Court. However, in general, the 
Labour court has sent a message to employers regarding the meaning of pregnancy in the 
workplace: the career aspirations of expectant mothers cannot be trifled with. Woolworths 
supra has just experienced its own labour pains by rejecting a mother-to-be.  
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The onus placed on the employer to prove a legitimate business rationale to prove the 
existence of a fair reason to discriminate a pregnant employee can no longer be a difficult one 
to discharge. The Court has therefore provided employers with the necessary flexibility in all 
but the most difficult cases in dealing with the issue of pregnancy. The acceptance of the 
principle of perfectly commercial considerations would make it to be a difficult element to 
strike the right balance. It is therefore arguably clear that the standard required of employees 
in proving unfair dismissal would be much compelling. Employers may, of course, take 
comfort from the approach adopted in the Woolworths decision with its emphasis on an 
enquiry pertaining to perfectly commercial considerations rather than whether there has been 
a material violation of the employee‘s basic fundamental rights. In the Woolworths case, it 
would appear, without deciding, that the Labour Appeal Court has been very sympathetic 
towards Woolworths’ business needs. However, it is the recognition in this decision of the 
fact that business considerations and / profitability may be equally weighed against the 
employee‘s basic rights. This may lead employees to carefully reconsider their claim of unfair 
dismissal based on pregnancy or reasons related to their pregnancy in the future.  
 
Whether the approach followed by the Labour Appeal Court in the Woolworths supra 
judgment is correct in terms of equity and reasonableness has however been a matter of 
debate. Of much concern is Whether the Court had struck the right balance in reconciling the 
rights of employees not to be unfairly discriminated against on the basis of their pregnancy 
with the imperatives of the employer to operate an efficient and cost effective business or 
Organization is, of course, one that can be debated. It is however submitted that, by and large, 
through the Woolworths decision, this has been achieved.  
 
Like in Woolworths supra, Ms Whitehead did more than win her case. She spoke out publicly 
against her humiliation. She struck an immense blow for the rights of expectant mothers in the 
job market. Her case lays down the rule that, except perhaps employers can prove that the task 
for which they intend to appoint a person must be executed in its entirety within about nine 
months, they cannot discard a female applicant solely because she must take maternity leave 
soon after appointment. This principle will presumably hold regardless of whether the 
pregnant applicant discloses her condition as Ms Whitehead did, or keeps mum. It is 
encouraging to witness this public openness as doing so gives courage to those women who 
might be going through the same ordeal but who do not have the opportunity to open up and 
confront such a monster head-on.  
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The controversy and uncertainty in the Woolworths case might very well have some future 
Court pronouncements. Whether attempts to encourage and hold the Woolworths principle 
would materialize to a significant degree and to what extent in the future is, of course, 
difficult to predict. It is however hoped that the decisions of the labour courts reflects a 
concerted endeavour to accommodate our ideals as a society within the constraints of our 
times and circumstances. If women are to experience the full richness life as citizens of our 
country, we may have to think more deeply about the issues of motherhood and parenting 
than rely on narrowly focused rules of law. It is submitted, however, that the next decade of 
dismissals in South Africa will see a burgeoning interest in dismissals for pregnancy. Many 
issues will be coming to the fore and would demand re-examination of concepts such as job 
continuity/ inherent requirement of a job and commercial considerations. A brief historical 
overview will help place these concepts in perspective.  
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